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ABSTRACT
This article looks at how Kazakhstan’s heavy dependence on fossil 
fuels and its political context shape national discourse on climate 
change. Based on extensive analysis of the country’s strategic docu-
ments and expert interviews, we argue that although Kazakhstan’s 
economy relies on fossil fuels, the government is keen to promote 
sustainable development to attract international investments and 
advance its image as a ‘strong state’ for the domestic audience, and 
as a progressive and reliable partner for the international audience. 
Whilst there is little evidence of ‘post-colonial’ rhetoric appearing in 
Kazakhstan’s official climate change discourse, the state’s past is 
evident in its instrumental approach to environmental issues which 
in turn translates into inconsistencies in its climate change policy.
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Kazakhstan positions itself as a regional leader in terms of implementing climate change 
mitigation measures while also being the largest recipient of global multilateral climate 
funds in Central Asia (CA) (OECD, 2016). The state made commitments under the Paris 
Agreement, and in 2013 declared its intention to transform to a green economy by 2050. 
However, the feasibility of these national strategies is doubtful. The Kazakh economy relies 
heavily on fossil fuels, which accounted for 21% of its GDP in 2020, and around 70% of the 
country’s exports (World Bank, n.d.). Kazakhstan is the 9th largest crude oil and 14th largest 
natural gas exporter in the world, and it ranks in the top 14 states in terms of natural gas 
reserves (CIA.gov, 2021). Natural gas production increased twofold from 2013–2016, and oil 
production reached its peak in 2019 with policymakers planning to double output by 2025 
(IEA, 2020). Kazakhstan lags behind other fossil fuel exporters in terms of energy efficiency 
and diversity1 (IRENA, n.d.) as its energy mix is dominated by coal which makes up 47% of 
the country's total primary energy supply (TPES) followed by oil and gas which account for 
around 25% each (IEA, 2020). Whilst Kazakhstan has managed to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions’ by 3–5% by 20202 (from 1990 levels), an increase of 6–9% is likely by 
20303 if the state pursues a ‘business as usual’ approach (IEA, 2020). Thus, current state 
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policies are insufficient to help meet the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) goal to keep warming below 1.5–2 C (Climate Analytics, 2019).
Over the last decade, we have seen an increase in studies on climate change politics in 
developing countries with semi-authoritarian/authoritarian forms of governance (e.g. 
Kopra, 2018; Korppoo, 2016; Poberezhskaya, 2016; Schreurs, 2011); however, CA in gen-
eral and Kazakhstan in particular, remain largely ignored (Poberezhskaya & Danilova, 
2021). This article contributes to the existing literature gap in the following ways. Firstly, 
it offers a comprehensive analysis of the decision-making process on climate change- 
related issues in Kazakhstan and how it fits with national and international policy agendas. 
Secondly, it analyses how the fossil fuel economy coexists with climate change politics 
and how their mutually exclusive goals are presented within official rhetoric. Thirdly, it 
looks at the reasons for policymakers to advance a ‘green economy’ discourse in resource 
dependent developing countries with authoritarian forms of governance. Lastly, the 
article contributes to the theoretical debate by exploring whether the country’s post-
colonial self-image plays a role in national climate change rhetoric. By the application of 
discourse analysis we argue that although Kazakhstan’s economy is based on fossil fuels, 
the government promotes the idea of green development to attract international invest-
ments as well as to advance its image as a ‘strong state’ (for the domestic audience), and 
as a progressive and reliable partner (for international audiences).
To achieve these aims, we first look at Kazakhstan’s vulnerabilities to climate change. 
We then offer theoretical and methodological considerations, followed by the analysis 
which is set in three sections looking at the domestic, international and green economy 
discourses. We conclude with a comprehensive discussion of the main narratives identi-
fied in Kazakhstan’s climate policy.
Climate change in Kazakhstan: geography, threats and vulnerabilities
Kazakhstan is the 9th largest country in the world by territory, but its population is 
relatively small at around 18 million and is unevenly distributed throughout the country 
(mostly located in the south). The majority of the country is covered by desert, semi- 
desert, and steppes. It is these geographic characteristics that shed light on the country’s 
climate change vulnerabilities. For instance, as in the rest of CA, climate change is 
negatively affecting Kazakhstan’s already fragile water security situation (World Bank, 
2014), this includes rapidly melting glaciers (the main source of drinking water) and 
a change in the ‘peak flow of key rivers’ impacting the growing season as well as further 
contributing to rapid land degradation and desertification, a reduction in agricultural 
yields, and transboundary conflicts in the region (Bernauer & Siegfried, 2012; Xenarios 
et al., 2019). As climate change worsens, according to the Asian Development Bank, by 
2050 it will lead to additional yearly expenditures of US$550 million to mitigate freshwater 
deficiency in CA (CAN, 2014).
The negative effects of climate change are spread unevenly throughout Kazakhstan with 
more precipitation in the north and increasingly less precipitation in the south which can 
cause substantial damage to both the population’s health and to local agriculture. Like many 
other places, Kazakhstan is likely to suffer from changes in the ‘transmission of infectious 
diseases, increased mortality and morbidity from extreme weather events and reduced 
availability of clean water’ (WHO, 2009). Indeed, Kazakhstan is already suffering from the 
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increased frequency and intensity of floods, mudflows, heatwaves (e.g. heatwaves in 2010 and 
2014), forest and steppe fires, and sudden changes in temperature. Extreme weather events 
(associated with climate change) have been seen to destroy people’s houses, and damage 
existing utility infrastructure (interview 5). These problems also jeopardise Kazakhstan’s 
agricultural industry (it is one of the world’s largest wheat producers), and it has already 
noticed ‘reduced crop yields from drought and fires’ (WHO, 2009). For instance, in 2012 and 
2014 the country’s crops were severely damaged or destroyed (15% and 8% respectively). It is 
estimated that if farming practices remain the same, the decrease in annual harvests may 
reach 49% due to climate change (Ministry of Energy of the RK, 2017). Arguably, climate 
change also contributes to man-made disasters, for instance, a collapse of the dam wall of 
Sardoba reservoir which, whilst located in Uzbekistan, affected neighbouring Kazakhstan by 
destroying properties and causing US$10 million in damage in the agricultural sector 
(Simonov, 2020). All these problems can potentially threaten the social stability of the country 
as ‘one sixth of the work force in Kazakhstan works in the agriculture, forestry and fishery 
sectors’ (Ministry of Energy of the RK, 2017). Kazakhstan’s vulnerability also comes from its 
over reliance on the extraction of natural resources which (as discussed at length below) 
serves as a foundation for the country’s economic growth.
Due to CA’s socio-economic and political problems, scholars point to its potentially low 
levels of adaptation abilities (Deng & Chen, 2017; Fay et al., 2010). This includes limited climate 
change awareness and a great disparity in available resources for economic development 
(World Bank, 2015). Existing problems with the transparency and openness of local govern-
ments, a lack of freedom of speech and restricted ‘citizen dialogue’ further hinder regional 
climate change adaptation (Stan Radar, 2016). Both climate change mitigation and adaptation 
struggles could also be explained by consistent prioritisation of seemingly more important 
issues (e.g. economic and political stability). Additionally, climate change policies in 
Kazakhstan must survive constant institutional change. For example, Kazakhstan numerously 
modified its environmental governance structure, the first institutional formation being 
a Ministry of Ecology and Bioresources which was established in 1992, and its most recent 
reincarnation being the Ministry of Ecology, Geology and Natural Resources which was 
officially formed in 2019 (in between there were four other Ministries that governed similar 
areas under different names). The latter now hosts the Department of Climate Policy and 
Green Technology (www.gov.kz). At the regional level, climate action is restrained by the lack 
of cooperation between neighbouring states, which rather see the issue as a reason for 
conflicts rather than an opportunity for cooperation (International Crisis Group, 2011). For 
instance, a struggle over freshwater and energy resources has already become a source of 
regional tension.
In sum, Kazakhstan’s vulnerability comes from its specific geographical characteristics, 
and its unique economic, social and political situation where semi-authoritarian rule co- 
exists with a carbon-intensive economy. We argue that Kazakhstan’s political history as 
well as its current foreign policy significantly contribute to the state’s identity and 
subsequently, shape its climate change-related policies and processes.
Theory
Viewing the Soviet Union (SU) as an empire and its former members as postcolonial states, 
can be useful in understanding Kazakhstan’s national identity and its environmental 
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rhetoric. Heathershaw (2010) argues that ‘the post-coloniality of Central Asian states is an 
integral dimension of their continuance today’ (p. 10), and postcolonial theory is a key to 
understanding state discourses and their effects. Dubuisson (2020, p. 9) notices that in 
Kazakhstan, the discourses of the former Soviet space still shape both environmental 
decision-making and public responses to the issues of land protection, conservation and 
natural resources.
Postcolonial theory is concerned with the ‘forces of oppression and coercive domina-
tion that operate in the contemporary world’ (Young, 2001, p. 11) where current dis-
courses of colonised countries are shaped by their historical past. Heathershaw (2010, p. 8) 
identifies three conceptual tools of postcolonial theory: hybridity, subalternity, oriental-
ism. Hybridity – or inbetweenness – refers to transcultural forms of politics where new 
nationalist goals are underpinned by colonial thinking. Soviet states were constructed as 
colonial entities by the nation-builder (Smith et al., 1998); hence, postcolonial self-image 
underpins the political discourse of the post-Soviet landscape. In the case of Kazakhstan, it 
is still legitimising presidential rhetoric (Kudaibergenova, 2016a, p. 920). ‘Subalternity’ 
means control imposed by the ruling elites. The Soviet leaders distributed control through 
the local communist elites, and this allowed certain Kazakh officials to retain their status 
after the regime’s collapse (Dave, 2007, p. 95). Shakhanova (2017) argues that the 
influence of Russia as Kazakhstan’s ‘historical other’ still influences in some way national 
decision-making processes. Lastly, ‘orientalism’ signifies the production of knowledge 
through power – construction of national identity and culture through the discourse of 
the coloniser (Said, 1978). Soviet power produced knowledge both about and for the CA 
states – it created them as subjects to empire, and arguably it continues to affect current 
generations (Adams, 2008; Heathershaw, 2010).
Beissinger and Young (2002, p. 24) highlight an important role of postcolonial image in 
independent Kazakhstan characterising its political discourse by the ‘silent incorporation 
of its colonial origins’. However, the ‘struggle over identity’ is a key feature in Kazakhstan’s 
national discourse as the state faces the challenge of the reinvention of itself both 
nationally and internationally (Dave, 2007; Fierman, 2009). The presence of postcolonial 
rhetoric can also be seen in omissions. For instance, by not creating a robust state 
ideology, the elites adopted the language of former oppressor to re-legitimatise authority 
in the post-Soviet era (Kudaibergenova, 2016a). As a result, modern Kazakh postcolonial-
ism comes as ‘a purely political and nationalising discourse’ (ibid, p. 921) that constructs 
and maintains the state’s identity.
The issue of identity is also prominent in ‘green’ postcolonial scholarship as it focuses 
on the issues of power dynamics, the colonisation of nature and displacement of envir-
onmental practices (Grove & Grove, 1996; Plumwood, 2006). This is particularly relevant to 
the context of the former SU with its anthropocentric policies exported from Moscow to 
the republics (Sharipova, 2019). Likewise, postcolonial rhetoric penetrates the discourse of 
climate change, which is shaped by social problems, power relations, economic interests 
and the (inter-)national image of the state (Dubuisson, 2020). As Huggan (2004, p. 702) 
notes, the rise of ‘green’ postcolonial studies was in effect to understand that colonialism 
and imperialism cannot be explained without ‘engaging with the massive scale of 
environmental devastation that they entail’. Providing the ground for ‘struggles over 
resources, legitimacy, and meaning’ (Kandiyoti, 2002, p. 295), the postcolonial context 
applied to climate change politics enforces a critical view of the discourses encountered 
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with the use of natural resources, mitigation practices and the negative effects of climate 
change.
To date, Kazakhstan, as well as the whole CA region, has been largely overlooked in 
postcolonial studies (Moore, 2001) and there are two main reasons for this. First, the SU 
was never recognised as a traditional colonial power (Edgar, 2006, p. 255) because of its 
‘modernisation’ projects and nativization policy (‘korenizatsia’), and the combination of 
imperial and state modernising practices (Adams, 2008). Chernetsky et al. (2006) describe 
the Soviet power as ‘expressly internationalist yet zealously territorial and expansionist’ 
(p. 832) – such an image makes one see Kazakhstan primarily in post-socialist and post- 
Soviet rather than in postcolonial terms. Second, there is a lack of postcolonial thought 
inside the region as most local scholars avoid rhetoric associated with oppression and 
third world countries (Abashin, 2014). But as ‘the arrival of post-colonialism in Central 
Asian studies is long over-due’ (Heathershaw, 2010, p. 1), recently one can observe 
a growing body of this type of research (e.g. Beissinger & Young, 2002; Edgar, 2006; 
Kandiyoti, 2002; Khalid, 2006) as well as specific application of post-colonialism to envir-
onmental issues in the region (Adams, 2008; Dubuisson, 2020; Kudaibergenova, 2016b; 
Sharipova, 2019). Inspired by this theoretical discussion, we look at how Kazakh political 
elites construct the image of the country within climate change discourse and whether 
the country’s postcolonial past is affecting its current responses to climate change.
Methodological considerations
Van Dijk (2001, p. 357) argues that control over public discourse is ‘a first major form of 
power’, thus discourse analysis can be seen as a key tool in understanding policymaking 
process (Leipold et al., 2019), including the one revolving around climate change-related 
issues (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019; Wilson Rowe, 2013). Therefore, for this qualitative 
study, we employ discourse analysis of Kazakhstan’s official documents and expert inter-
views. Specifically, we applied political discourse analysis (PDA) which looks at how 
political actors construct beliefs and actions of broader society through language. The 
collected data were analysed by the means of the toolkit adopted from Van Dijk (2013, 
pp. 175–196) which allowed us to explore six analytical categories: membership, typical 
activities, aims, norms, position, and resources involved. Membership criteria points to the 
speaker’s self-identity and attachment to a certain social group; typical activities criteria 
describe the actor’s common action; aims point to what the actor wants and how this is 
reasoned; norms define what is good or bad in the actor’s opinion; position indicates 
relationships with others; resources show what the actor has or does not have (ibid). The 
texts were coded with the software NVIVO-12. Further interpretations were done manu-
ally as computer-based analytics may limit and confuse the findings (Charmaz, 2000, 
p. 520).
We analysed five official documents (see Table 1 for the list) which serve as 
a foundation for Kazakhstan’s climate policy (as claimed in the 7th national communica-
tion of the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) to the UNFCCC (Ministry of Energy of the RK, 2017, 
pp. 75–77)). The importance of these documents was also highlighted through interviews: 
‘in Kazakhstan we have a hierarchical state management with a unified system of state 
planning’ with ‘Strategy-2050’ being the most important one whilst everything else 
complies with it (interview 6). Thus, even if climate change is not featured in these 
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documents, climate-related policies must correlate with the state’s outlined goals, visions 
and plans.
Moreover, we interviewed Kazakhstan’s policymakers and experts who contributed to 
domestic climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies, environmental legislation, 
the national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), communications to the UNFCCC and so 
forth. We also consulted national and international NGOs’ members and scientists who 
directly affect policy-making decisions. The participants were asked open-ended ques-
tions guided by a topic list, which was adjusted depending on the participant’s area of 
expertise. While most of the interviews were held as conversations of 40–60 minutes in 
length, two experts shared their thoughts in writing. We interviewed 13 experts in the 
period of February–March 2021.
Analysis
The analysis of the collected data showed that overall climate change is underrepresented 
within the state’s official discourse. Even when the discussed policies directly affect GHG 
emissions in the country, there are often no explicit connections with climate change (e.g. 
the ‘Green Economy Concept’). It is only in the ‘Strategy to 2020’ that climate change is 
discussed in alarming terms to ensure the advancement of rational resource use. The 
lukewarm attitude towards the problem among state officials was also voiced by inter-
viewees who indicated that even the policy of decarbonisation or development of renew-
able energy sources (RES) often do not have climate change links, negatively impacting 
awareness of the problem (e.g. interview 6). The analysis showed that climate change 
policy is affected by three discursive categories: national strength, development of 
a green economy and international cooperation (see Table 2). It is within those discursive 
dimensions that we present our findings.
Climate change and national strength
Kazakhstan has been engaged with the global climate change policy framework since 1995 
(Ministry of Energy of the RK, 2017); however, it has been slow with regard to national 
Table 1. Analysed documents.
Document Released date Description Relation to climate change
Strategy Kazakhstan 2050: 
A New Political Course of 
the Established State
14 December 2012 Provides a long-term vision for 
strategic development of the 
state




Concept for Transition of the 
RK to a Green Economy
30 May 2013 Sets the ground for systemic 
transformations to a green 
economy
Transition to a low carbon 
economy;
Strategic Plan for 
Development of the RK 
until 2020
1 February 2010 Sets a strategic plan fornational 
development for a 10-year 
period
Transition to a low carbon 
economy;
Concept of Innovative 
Development of the RK 
until 2020
4 June 2013 Sets a strategic plan for transition 
to innovative economy
Developing RES and energy- 
saving technologies
Plan of the Nation – 100 
Concrete Steps
6 May 2015 Sets a response to global socio- 
economic challenges and 
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commitments. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol was ratified only in 2009. Just throughout 
the last decade related policies started to be included in the key national documents, for 
instance, transition of all mining companies to environmentally friendly production 
(‘Strategy-2050’), privatising agricultural lands to encourage their efficient use, and repla-
cing outdated construction standards with the ‘eurocodes’ (‘100 Concrete Steps’). In 2010, 
Kazakhstan adopted a law ‘on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan Relating to Environmental Issues’ which allowed the country to start trading 
emissions and to encourage Joint Implementation (JI) projects. This led to the establish-
ment of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in Kazakhstan, the only project of its kind in 
the Post-Soviet space. The pilot stage launched in 2013 and included 178 companies 
representing extractive industries (responsible for 55% of the state’s GHG emissions) with 
the requirement to keep emissions levels at the base line year of 2010 (Ministry of Energy of 
the RK, 2017). Subsequent phases had more ambitious targets and included a wider range 
of participants positively contributing to the switch towards a greener economy. It should 
be noted that the first two rounds of the ETS were not successful in encouraging 
participants to cut GHG emissions (because of loose rules on access to quotas) whilst 
after the suspension of the scheme in 2016 adjustments were made to motivate industries 
to start lowering their emissions (interview 9). Despite some industrial lobbying against the 
ETS’s existence (ibid), the scheme resumed in 2018. The ETS was meant to be an economic 
mechanism to regulate carbon emissions, but our analysis showed that it also became 
another proud moment in Kazakhstan’s national politics (interview 4):
When we were in full swing trading quotas, in Moscow there was still almost no talk about it 
[. . .] Moreover, I think that it is not only Russia, but Kazakhstan occupies a leading position 
among all CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries.
Overall, national climate policy contributes to a persistent narrative of Kazakhstan being 
a ‘strong state’ which can deal with various risks, including climate change. In fact, climate 
change is not only a challenge, but an opportunity to switch towards sustainable 
Table 2. Discursive categories with examples.
Identity Activity Aims Norms Relationship Resources
National 
strength
Strong state Progress made 



























































development to further improve the country’s domestic stability and its international 
position. In the ‘Strategy-2050’, former President Nazarbayev proclaimed Kazakhstan’s 
objective ‘to be among the top 30 global economies by 2050’ which developed into an 
extensive concept of national strength and prosperity (see also ‘100 Concrete Steps’). The 
idealistic portrayal of Kazakhstan’s bright future includes all aspects of its development: 
economic modernisation, education, health, women’s rights and so on. Moreover, 
‘Strategy-2050’ presents an interesting example of how Nazarbayev identifies himself 
with Kazakhstan as the strategy looks a lot like a personal letter from a father figure 
rather than a state leader:
I call on all people to arm themselves with eternal qualities - diligence, hard work and 
dedication, which will help us to resist and create a worthy future for our Motherland. 
I believe in you. I believe that we will not miss a new historic chance.
This personification of politics became evident also during our interviews. For instance, 
some experts noted that the whole idea of sustainable development and green economy 
could be attributed to Nazarbayev’s personal desire to earn international recognition4 
(e.g. interview 1). Furthermore, several interviewees pointed to current President 
Tokayev’s professional background (specifically, his former role as a Director-General at 
the UN’s Geneva office) which allows him to understand international positions on major 
issues and how to attract positive attention and investments to address sustainable 
development and climate change problems in the country (interviews 3 & 4). This is 
particularly important as in Kazakhstan’s climate policy the president is considered to be 
the main decision-maker (interview 4).
The presentation of Kazakhstan as a strong state is also solidified against the trouble-
some historical background with the emphasis on the challenging post-Soviet period 
(rather than the Soviet one). For example, despite ‘the post-Soviet chaos’ the state’s 
leadership through the ‘right’ political strategy and ‘hard work’ has managed to improve 
Kazakhstan’s politics and economy (‘Strategy-2050’). Climate politics emerging in 
Kazakhstan during this post-Soviet period appear to be a response to global trends or 
even ‘as a tribute of fashion because everyone talked about the climate, which means that 
we [Kazakhstan] also needed to talk about it’ (interview 11).
However, there are obvious limitations with the national climate change policy that are 
evident through a lack of coherency with existing mitigation and adaptation efforts, 
limited coordination among involved stakeholders and the lack of a national strategy/ 
programme specifically dedicated to climate change which would bring together a range 
of measures and actions (Ministry of Energy of the RK, 2017). This sentiment of institu-
tional incoherency was echoed by our interviewees, as several of them highlighted that 
the complexity of climate change requires coordination between various state and private 
institutions which is currently limited. The problem translates into mutually exclusive 
policy decisions and steps, as one of the NGO representatives (interview 6) sharply noted 
‘it is impossible to increase livestock breeding and at the same time reduce [GHG] 
emissions.’
Kazakhstan’s climate policy is further weakened by constant institutional change (as 
mentioned above) where the accumulation of knowledge on complex environmental 
problems ‘thins out’ as people go in and out of their ministerial positions or switch 
between various institutions (interviews 1 & 13). The problem is then complicated by 
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the limitations of climate science development in the country. Whilst important work has 
been done by the local scientific institutions (e.g. ‘Kazhydromet’, Scientific and 
Educational Centre ‘Green Academy’, Nazarbayev University and KazNU research groups) 
and they are able to advise the state’s climate policy (along with the relevant NGOs), there 
is a ‘lack of policy to build the capacity of young scientists and maintain a continuity [of 
climate knowledge]’ (interview 8). Furthermore, despite Kazakhstan’s commitment to 
develop national science (‘Concept of ID to 2020’), there is a lack of skilled ecologists in 
Kazakhstan, and the average wage in academia remains quite low (interview 11).
To sum up, the discursive representation of national strength and pride where even 
climate change threats are seen as an opportunity rather than a constraint is weakened 
by the reality of Kazakhstan’s climate policies that require a more consistent national 
effort.
Climate change and green economy
The most popular narrative in all analysed documents is the discussion of ‘green econ-
omy’ and ‘sustainable development’ which suggests that the government seeks to resolve 
existing environmental problems, including climate change, without economic loss and 
abandonment of its resource driven economy. Here, sustainable development includes 
energy efficiency, diversification of the economy, and contribution to social and economic 
stability with the creation of new employment opportunities (for example, by 2050, it is 
expected that more than 500,000 jobs will be created) (‘Green Economy Concept’). Thus, it 
is seen as an opportunity ‘to find money for decarbonisation’ and to follow global trends 
where tightening international carbon regulations leads to the same processes inside the 
country (interview 3). For example, as more countries, including the USA, Canada and 
China, are about to introduce the carbon tax, it is reasonable for Kazakhstan to enforce 
domestic regulations on businesses rather than to face budget losses (interview 9). 
Changes in the international market already led to some positive developments in 
Kazakhstan’s national climate policy – for example, the requirement to disclose annual 
GHG emissions (World Bank, 2018) which concerns organisations/businesses emitting 
more than 20,000 tons a year (interview 6).
The analysed texts also demonstrate a presence of ‘resource nationalism’, where 
Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel reserves are presented as ‘the powerhouse of our economy’ 
(‘Strategy-2050’). Interestingly, the discourse of sustainable development and economic 
modernisation does not clash with the notion of national pride in the extractive industry 
which is explained by the fact that GHG emissions from fossil fuel extraction are relatively 
low (interviews 10, 11 & 13) while the majority of extracted resources are exported. Hence, 
it is not the state’s concern what happens with fossil fuels once they are exported: ‘we 
drove it [oil] into the pipeline, and it went on, and what happens next is not important. We 
extract – we sell, that is it’ (interview 10). On the other hand, it is stated that success in the 
oil and gas industries will help to build a new economy for the future as well as to 
strengthen Kazakhstan’s role in international affairs dealing with global problems, includ-
ing environmental ones. For example, the ‘Strategy-2050’ claims: ‘we have been blessed 
with abundant natural resources and other countries will need to rely on us for their 
resource needs’. Poberezhskaya and Danilova (2021) argue that in Kazakhstan’s official 
discourse even climate change is presented as another ‘resource’ that is utilised to bring 
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benefits to the state, for instance, to present itself as an active participant of the interna-
tional community.
Interestingly, climate change also appears as an opportunity to embrace innovation: 
‘the threat of climate change and limited natural resources have led to a scientific and 
technological breakthrough’ (‘Concept of ID to 2020’). The majority of Kazakhstan’s own 
GHG emissions comes from over reliance on coal and oil for the domestic market which is 
exacerbated by the infrastructure, technology, and standards inherited from the Soviet 
period: about 50% of energy-related infrastructure in the country is older than 30 years, 
some 50–60 years old (ADB, 2013). In the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), 
Kazakhstan’s carbon intensity is behind even developing nations including fellow former 
Soviet republics like Russia, Belarus, Armenia and Turkmenistan (UNECE, 2019). Therefore, 
Kazakhstan has strong capacity to reduce GHG emissions through improvements in 
energy efficiency as well as switching to RES (Karatayev & Clarke, 2016).
Indeed, Kazakhstan has necessary natural, climatic, and economic conditions to 
develop sustainable energy solutions, being the only country in CA which has both 
significant solar and wind energy capacity (Samruk-Kazyna, 2018). Relatively speaking, 
the country has already achieved some positive results given the steady growth of RES 
productivity over the past decade (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the data on solar capacities 
has become publicly accessible (AtlasSolar, 2017), financing of renewable energy 
increased from US$1.33 million in 2010 to US$93 million in 2018 (IRENA, 2019), and the 
sector has attracted foreign financial and technical support (e.g. EUR 300 million from the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and US$107.8 million from 
the Clean Technology Fund) (Ministry of Energy of the RK, 2017).
As a result Kazakhstan has achieved its goal of reaching 3% of RES in energy mix by 
2020 as stated by the Minister of Energy (Sabekov, 2021). However, there is a widespread 
opinion that the 2030 target of 35% and the 2050 target of 50% will be missed (interviews 
3, 6, 9 & 11). In fact, the renewable energy sector continues to suffer from various barriers 
including limited regulatory components and the lack of a feed-in tariff system (Koch & 
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Figure 1. RES sector in Kazakhstan, 2010–2019. Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from 
KazStat (2021).
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expected to compete with traditional fuel supplies, which have long been (and continue 
to be) aided by artificially low electricity prices supported by state subsidies (Wheeler, 
2017). Interestingly, along with the RES, nuclear energy is also seen as one of the ways to 
reduce GHG emissions and contribute to climate change mitigation (Ministry of Energy of 
the RK, 2017). However, due to the country’s difficult past (e.g. nuclear pollution caused by 
the Semipalatinsk testing site) nuclear energy, as in many other parts of the world, is 
a contested topic (interview 9) (see also Howie et al., 2020).
The narrative of ‘modernisation’ and economic prosperity is persistent not only 
through all the documents that impact the state’s climate change strategy but also in 
Nazarbayev’s overall official rethoric (Kudaibergenova, 2015; Seydullayeva et al., 2015). 
Unsurprisingly, within the discourse of ‘green economy’, the ‘economy’ part takes clear 
priority over the ‘green’ one. Thus, the aim of sustainable development is to strengthen 
Kazakhstan’s political and economic stance rather than deal with the climate crisis as the 
‘initiatives that not only improve the environmental situation but also result in increased 
economic benefits will be prioritised’ (‘Green Economy Concept’).
Climate change and international cooperation
Our data demonstrate that Kazakhstan is presented as a ‘responsible and reliable partner 
with significant influence in the international arena’ (‘Strategy–2050’). This image is 
supported by Kazakhstan’s role as a contributor to global energy security; a cultural 
‘bridge’ connecting the Islamic and Christian worlds, the East and the West; a guarantor 
of regional security in CA; and a global ambassador (‘Strategy to 2020’). The global 
environmental crisis in this regard is seen as an opportunity to solidify this image. 
Furthermore, there is a clear discursive alignment with international actors and practices 
that serve as examples of successful sustainable development and economic diversifica-
tion (e.g. ‘Concept to ID’). For example, the international exposition ‘Future Energy’ (EXPO- 
2017) held in Kazakhstan became a symbol of national pride (e.g. ‘Concept to ID’; 
‘Strategy–2050’) contributing to all identified narratives: advancing the image of the 
strong state for Kazakhstan and of a powerful leader for President Nazarbayev (inter-
view 1), as well as bringing attention to the green economy and Kazakhstan’s interna-
tional commitments (Poberezhskaya & Danilova, 2021). This desire to match expectations 
of the global community (mostly the EU and the OECD members) correlates with 
Kazakhstan’s persistent interest in gaining Western approval since its independence in 
1991 (Koch, 2018; Schatz, 2006) and perseverance of the ‘multi-vector policy’ which is 
described in the ‘Strategy to 2020’ as ‘friendly relations of equal cooperation with all 
states’.
Against this backdrop, Kazakhstan’s GHG emissions reduction goals present an inter-
esting case. Whilst in 1990 emissions were relatively high, following the economic 
collapse caused by the dissolution of the SU and political and social instability throughout 
the 1990s (Bolesta, 2019), Kazakhstan unintentionally almost halved its emissions from the 
base-line year (see Figure 2). As the country stabilised economically from 2000 onwards, 
emissions have been steadily increasing, though they remained below the 1990 base level 
at least until 20185 (Figure 2). Therefore, Kazakhstan was able to make reduction commit-
ments without economic sacrifice. Indeed, under the Paris Agreement, Kazakhstan aims to 
keep GHG emissions 15% below the 1990 level by 2030 (an unconditional target). 
However, unlike many countries, Kazakhstan also has a ‘conditional target’ of 25% GHG 
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emissions reduction by 2030: the condition requires ‘additional international investments, 
access to low carbon technology transfer mechanisms, green climate funds and flexible 
mechanisms for countries in economic transition’ (Government of the RK, 2015). Experts 
argue that even despite the economic recession of the 1990s, if Kazakhstan continues 
a ‘business as usual’ approach without introducing robust punitive measures, it will not 
reach the GHG emissions reduction targets (interviews 3, 4 & 9) with some suggesting that 
emissions already exceed the base line (interview 11) (although there are no official data 
yet). There is still a possibility to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 (as announced by the 
president in September 2020) by offsetting emissions via various projects, but that would 
require the state’s commitment and substantial investments (interviews 9 & 13).
The paradox of relatively ambitious goals despite a lack of aspiration to give up its fossil 
fuel driven economy is explained by Kazakhstan’s desire to impress international partners; 
Nazarbayev’s personal drive to be seen as a modern leader committed to global sustain-
able development; limited understanding of how those commitments will be practically 
transferred into economic and industrial changes; and the above mentioned interest in 
foreign investments6 (interview 4 & 3).
Indeed, Kazakhstan has been quite successful in attracting global attention to its 
climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. In 2015, US$416.3 million were allo-
cated to climate-related projects with 97% coming from ‘loans’ and 3% as ‘grant assis-
tance’ (in addition to the EBRD, funding was also provided by the Global Environment 
Facility (US$9.66 million), USA (US$1.83 million), Japan (US$30,000) and South Korea (US 
$22,000)) (Ministry of Energy of the RK, 2017). Furthermore, that same year, the World 
Bank (2015) committed US$38 million ‘from the International Development Association to 
finance the first phase of the Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Program for Aral Sea 
Basin (CAMP4ASB)’. Among other investors and lenders are the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), European Union, World Health 
Organization (WHO), UNDP and USAID.
Figure 2. GHG emissions in Kazakhstan, 1990–2018. *GHG emissions, thousands of tons of CO2 
equivalent. Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the Ministry of Ecology, Geology 
and Natural Resources of the RK (2020, pp. 37–38).
12 M. POBEREZHSKAYA AND A. BYCHKOVA
We argue that Kazakhstan’s relations with foreign investors and Western partners is 
potentially the most evident manifestation of post-colonial rhetoric. Interestingly, whilst 
the blame is not allocated to the former ‘colonial power’ (the SU), it is occasionally 
attributed to the ‘developed economies’ and in particular Europe, for example:
the economy of Kazakhstan during the years of independence has developed mainly due to 
the extractive sectors that were attractive to foreign investors. And since in Europe, they were 
already greening, they naturally invested mainly in dirty production [. . .] the extraction of raw 
materials and the production of energy-intensive products (interview 6).
Kazakhstan’s international image is also supported through its pride in leading the way 
among developing countries. For instance, it committed to the Africa–Kazakhstan 
Partnership for the Sustainable Development Goals which aimed to assist 45 African 
states (budgeted at US$2 million). A similar agreement has been signed with the 
Caribbean Community, with Kazakhstan committing US$770,000 to help the region 
with their sustainability and climate change efforts. Kazakhstan has also initiated the inter- 
regional ‘Green Bridge’ partnership which is meant to stimulate a transition towards more 
sustainable economies (by 2019 the initiative included 15 countries and 12 NGOs) 
(Kozhanova, 2019). Kazakhstan’s leadership is particularly stressed with regard to CA:
Kazakhstan has a leading role [. . .] Others [CA countries] - yes, they have concerns, but they 
are concerned, that’s all. They may discuss, but they do not really do anything. And we [in 
Kazakhstan] can see the direction, development (interview 4).
Yes, so far Kazakhstan has been ahead of other states in the region [CA], mostly because it 
started first [working with climate change issues] (interview 3).
The international dimension of Kazakhstan’s climate change policy presents a number of 
opportunities for the interested stakeholders who can benefit from the state’s openness 
to financial investments but also its ambitions to be seen as an active global player. 
However, there is a danger of contributing to Kazakhstan’s policy of ‘greenwashing’ (Koch 
& Tynkkynen, 2021). Whilst the narratives of sustainable development and commitment to 
the global fight against climate change strengthen the image of the progressive state, 
arguably, the green rhetoric is also used as a tool of political control, promoting certain 
types of environmental behaviour among stakeholders, local policymakers and citizens 
(Domjan & Stone, 2010) that does not question the state’s reliance on fossil fuels.
Discussion
Our analysis demonstrates the limited presence of postcolonialism in Kazakhstan’s poli-
tical discourse of climate change. There is some evidence of the ‘non-responsibility’ 
rhetoric, a common characteristic of postcolonial narratives (Said, 1987), where the 
blame is allocated to advanced economies for investing primarily in ‘brown’ industries 
and moving carbon intensive facilities to developing countries, like Kazakhstan (inter-
views 4 & 9). Also, oil production is not seen as an environmental harm as it is mostly 
exported to the EU countries – hence, ‘they are the real polluters’ (interview 10). Such 
rhetoric is common for postcolonial states during climate change negotiations, where 
greater carbon reduction commitments are expected from the developed countries 
(Dubash, 2012; Rajao & Duarte, 2018).
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Despite relative silence over climate change issues, the studied documents do 
acknowledge some associated problems. Climate change is seen as one of the threats 
to Kazakhstan’s water security (e.g. ‘Green Economy Concept’), which is then linked with 
other potential issues, including deteriorating agriculture, negative impacts on trade and 
national finances, and overall state stability (‘Strategy 2020’). In these rare signs of 
vulnerability, we saw some allusions to the Soviet past where Kazakhstan became 
a victim of nature mismanagement (e.g. the Aral Sea). Dubuisson (2020) argues that 
environmental protection discourse is a responsibility discourse, and ‘any conceptualisa-
tion of “land and environmental protection” is a multiply discursive perspective in which 
different models of responsibility are invoked’ (p. 10). However, as the SU does not exist 
anymore, any attempts to blame it lose their value, especially, when considering that 
modern Kazakhstan continues to pursue similar approaches to nature (Kopack, 2019). 
Unsurprisingly, with regards to climate change we have not observed any explicit blame 
allocation (similar arguments can be seen in Poberezhskaya & Danilova, 2021). The finding 
is also supported by the conducted interviews, where acknowledgement of environmen-
tal problems caused by the SU go hand in hand with recollection of the benefits that the 
country used to enjoy:
during the SU, indeed, there were such dangerous industries [. . .] But, nevertheless, there 
were many good things, for example, the capital of Almaty was a very green city (interview 5).
people, of course, are very concerned about all of this [pollution accumulated during the 
Soviet time] [. . .] huge consequences, we still see now [. . .][but people talk about the USSR] 
not in a negative way, rather like this: [. . .] ‘What do we do with this? [. . .] mostly people speak 
well of the past [. . .] the social privileges that there were (interview 4).
The Soviet past is reflected in the technocratic approach to environmental protection 
which is still evident in Kazakhstan. In this view, techno-scientific progress can resolve any 
environmental problems with no need to sacrifice economic advancement: ‘we need to 
learn how to properly manage it [natural resources], saving our export revenues and, most 
importantly, transforming our natural resources into an efficient and sustainable vehicle 
for economic growth’ (‘Strategy-2050’). Indeed, the principle of prioritising the economy 
over the environment is strongly embedded in the state’s policies: ‘it is reported every-
where that we have “heavy” Soviet heritage when the economy was first, and environ-
ment last [. . .], but professional environmentalists see it is still the same’ (interview 9). 
Furthermore, the experts argue that environmental policies have not seen any significant 
progress since the time of the SU as the state has been moving by inertia: with almost all 
environmental legislation and emission norms remaining unchanged (interview 11).
While the Soviet-inspired attitude towards the environment looks irrational in the light 
of the current environmental agenda and ‘green’ political efforts, the ‘Soviet legacy’ here 
can be explained by the struggle with national identity (Sakal, 2015). As one of the experts 
mentioned, the country is still under recognized abroad, and it is difficult to explain what 
Kazakhstan is without referring to its Soviet past (interview 3). Although environmental 
rhetoric contributes to the state’s image and recognition at the international level 
(Weinthal & Watters, 2010), it is doubtful that such discourse brings a real change – as 
the approach to nature has not evolved.
Notably, within the ambiguous Kazakh national discourse, the image of the ‘strong 
state’ intertwines with the claims for international aid (Kudaibergenova, 2016a, p. 921). 
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For example, Kazakhstan is shown as a key geographical hotspot, the owner of abundant 
resources which may gain additional value in the face of environmental changes, and as 
a responsible state contributing to the global agenda. Meanwhile, the identity of 
a developing state is supported through emphasis on foreign investments and need for 
financial support. In line with Schatz (2006), we explain this conundrum as a reassertion of 
Kazakhstan’s postcolonial status. While the national economy is experiencing steady 
growth (see Figure 3), there are too many issues to touch upon regarding sustainable 
development, and it is hardly possible to achieve the proclaimed GHG emission reduction 
targets without external help (interview 3).
The alignment with international discourse invites financial support from international 
donors – thus there is little financial sense in climate denialism or scepticism 
(Poberezhskaya & Danilova, 2021) but instead the state presents climate policy as 
a policy of opportunities. Isaksen and Stokke (2014) identify a similar discursive turn in 
India’s political discourse: the ‘third world’ rhetoric is currently being replaced by a ‘win- 
win’ discourse (p. 114). Remarkably, Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel industries are not seen as 
a threat or a problem for sustainable development but in fact as ‘a guarantee of safety for 
present and future generations’ where ‘the oil and gas complex’ acts as ‘a locomotive for 
the entire economy’ (‘Strategy-2050’). Hence, national and international policies and 
rhetoric hardly match: the positive global image that is being promoted and investments 
in the renewable sector are overshadowed by energy inefficiencies, inconsistent policies 
and a lack of experts in the country.
Conclusion
In ‘Strategy-2050’ Nazarbayev firmly stated that the ‘economy is first, then politics’ which 
of course includes environmental politics. This approach is evident in the way climate 
change is often framed within both discussions of economic benefits (e.g. increasing 
energy efficiency, receiving foreign investments) or potential economic losses (e.g. intro-
duction of the carbon tax). Kazakhstan’s commitments to the fossil fuel industry prevents 
a more sophisticated climate change mitigation policy. At the same time, policy processes 
and initiatives that do exist in the country are constrained by limited support for climate 


































































Figure 3. Economic Growth in Kazakhstan, %GDP, 1991–2019. Source: Authors’ own elaboration based 
on data from the World Bank group (n.d.).
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with the institutionalisation and formalisation of the process, where decisions are 
impacted by those in the posts and/or their informal relations with interested parties 
(interview 2). Connected to this is the limited transparency of how decisions are made and 
the rationale behind them (ibid). Lastly, it does not help that the relevant state institutions 
tend to shift responsibility to one another rather than solving the issues collectively which 
is ‘very much a Soviet way’ of policymaking (interview 9, see also Mouraviev, 2021). The 
Soviet past also shows via instrumental attitudes towards the environment and the 
personification of the policy making process as well as its top-down approach. 
However, it did not manifest itself as part of the post-colonial rhetoric in Kazakhstan.
Based on the outlined findings, we suggest that relevant national and international 
policymakers should consider the following factors to advance climate change policy in 
Kazakhstan. Firstly, even if Kazakhstan’s government decides to part with its resource- 
intensive industries and move away from dependency on fossil fuel exports, it will not be 
able to do so in a short period of time and without external support. As such, a move could 
potentially result in serious social and political problems (e.g. leading to destabilisation in 
the regions where extractive industries are essential to people’s employment and/or to 
regional budgets) which is also an outcome of the Soviet legacy Kazakhstan has to deal 
with.7 Therefore, sustainable climate change mitigation policy should consider not only 
economic but also social implications. Secondly, despite the large volume of oil, gas, and 
coal reserves in Kazakhstan, there is an ongoing discussion of the nation’s energy security 
(Koulouri & Mouraviev, 2019) which presents an opportunity for highlighting the role of 
RES. Thirdly, the importance of Kazakhstan’s interest in its national and international image- 
building should be used to the advantage of climate change policy. As Kazakhstan stays 
faithful to its ‘multi-vector policy’ and a desire to be seen as an important global actor, it 
will not be able to disengage from the global climate regime. Fourthly, a sound climate 
policy requires extensive support of national climate science as well as engagement with 
other important actors, such as NGOs, media and business communities.
Whilst this article offers a comprehensive overview of the official discourse on climate 
change in Kazakhstan (contributing to climate change discussions in the post-Communist 
space (e.g. Martus, 2019; Poberezhskaya, 2016, 2018; Poberezhskaya & Ashe, 2018)), future 
research endeavours would benefit from a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of media, science, activists and business discourses to see how they impact 
climate change politics in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, considering the importance of the 
international dimension of Kazakhstan’s climate politics, the role of international organi-
sations needs to be explored in greater detail with particular focus on engagement (or 
a lack of it) by regional organisations (Ambrosio, 2008; Izotov & Obydenkova, 2021; 
Libman & Obydenkova, 2013, 2018a, 2018b). Lastly, following our findings on the impact 
of the political regime and the head of the state over climate change politics in 
Kazakhstan, a nuanced study of authoritarianism and its effect on environmental policies 
in CA would also be beneficial.8
To conclude, the above analysis shows a mismatch between the representation of 
Kazakhstan’s sustainable commitments and the real climate policy steps, in fact even the 
state’s proud regional leadership is questioned: ‘Kazakhstan is the leader in CA in terms of 
GHG emissions. What example can we set? Our emissions are growing, not decreasing [. . .] 
Maybe it is more an example in words, but in practice we didn’t show it’ (interview 11). 
Unfortunately, Kazakhstan is by far not the only country found in this predicament, where 
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rhetorical change is not met by adequate policy responses. Therefore, it is important for 
the stakeholders interested in advancing climate change policy in Kazakhstan to have 
a full understanding of the outlined objective and subjective factors impacting the state’s 
position on this environmental problem.
Notes
1. For instance, in China, Kazakhstan’s key strategic energy sector partner and the world’s 
leading coal producer, the share of coal in its energy mix dropped by 66% and renewables’ 
share reached 15% in 2020 (The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2020).
2. Partly due to the Covid-19 pandemic (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).
3. See Figure 2 for Kazakhstan’s GHG emissions’ trajectory.
4. Weinthal and Watters (2010) notice that Nazarbayev was using the rhetoric of environmental 
concern as a tool for building his image and legitimacy both in the domestic and interna-
tional arenas during his first years of leadership.
5. The base level is 401.87 million tons/year, and it was 396.57 in 2018
6. The concern over investments also underpins the recent silencing of coal production as the 
foreign sponsors (even China) are less motivated to support ‘brown’ industries (interview 10).
7. Like many other post-Communist countries (see: Kudaibergenova, 2016b; Lankina et al., 
2016a; Libman & Obydenkova, 2019; Nazarov & Obydenkova, 2020; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 
2017) Kazakhstan has been and still is dealing with a diverse range of Soviet legacies, such as 
corruption, its dependence on Soviet trade ties and misinformation.
8. The importance of democracy (associated with decentralisation, transparency, and lower 
corruption) for environmental policy and agenda has been studied in Payne 1995; 
Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2007); Libman and Obydenkova (2014), Obydenkova and 
Salahodjaev (2016, 2017), Obydenkova et al. (2016); Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013)
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